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Translation: Ewa Bodal 
David Kirsh (once again) shows us how much a few relatively simple studies, 
carried out without the use of technologically advanced methods, can bring 
into cognitive sciences. The text presented in this issue constitutes a broad 
discussion of the results of interviews, observations and experiments in which 
there took part 10 dancers and the choreographer of the Random Dance team. 
The results of the herein analysed research become the foundation for revis-
ing certain convictions regarding motoric cognition, mirror systems and the 
efficiency of internal simulations as a method of learning that have become 
widespread within neuro-cognitive sciences. Neuroscience claims that mental 
simulation can be equally efficient as one’s independent, physical exercising 
of the observed movement, and observing others sometimes yields equally 
good results as exercising an action on one’s own. Kirsh’s results show, how-
ever, that simulation and observation are efficient learning techniques when 
it comes to easy motoric actions, but fail in the case of complex movements 
(for  instance, dance phrases). The  key  observation  consists  in  the  fact that 
learning a motorically complex dance phrase through work on its simplified 
model is definitely more efficient than performing the phrase full-out. This 
stands in contrast not only to colloquial convictions regarding learning, but 
also to our romantic vision of dancing (we rarely consider this activity to be 
something that can be divided into proverbial prime factors, and then put 
together into a whole, thus achieving an “output” more perfect than the “in-
put”). Moreover, Kirsh claims that learning complex actions through working 
with simplified, distorted models works not only in case of dancing, but also 
playing instruments or space designing. 
The text constitutes also an important contribution to research on tool use and 
into cognitive theory of tools. It seems that at present cognitive disciplines do 
not offer a unified theory that would connect physical items with cognitive 
processes. We deal with the widespread opinion that artifacts, physical items, 
or broadly understood things are a significant factor that needs to be taken 
into consideration when explaining the human mind; we also have at our dis-
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posal a certain catalogue of approaches to various cognitive functions that can 
be fulfilled by things external to us. However, Kirsh does not stop at “sensitiz-
ing” of this kind. 
The implications for design of the paper seem by far more significant than the 
theoretical ones. Kirsh considers how responses to these questions translate 
into building interfaces or designing forms of human-computer interactions in 
IT communities of the near future, as well as how to re-design the process of 
learning in order to shorten it to the greatest possible degree or to allow the 
learner to achieve access to a completely new set of knowledge, skills or con-
ceptualisations. The question that permeates Kirsh’s other works returns here 
again: “What can we do in order to enable ourselves to think (do) things that 
are currently unthinkable (undoable)?”. 
It is worth mentioning here the notion of “bootstrapping,” introduced by Kirsh 
in one of his earlier texts in order to describe the development of cognitive 
processes. This notion can be found in many scientific disciplines where it 
describes self-supporting developmental processes occurring without external 
intervention. On an individual level, cognitive bootstrapping consists in the 
fact that various devices and external representations allow an individual to 
master new skills (including the use of new artifacts) which allow him or her 
to achieve a higher level; furthermore, with time some skills become mastered 
to such a degree that it is no longer necessary to use external support in the 
form of an artifact to make use of them (mental abacus technique constitutes 
a good example of that). On the scale of the entire species, a similar process 
can likewise be noticed; it consists in the fact that as a result of various inno-
vations and of their accumulation a basis is created that provides subsequent 
generations with a “head start” or a quicker development of skills and cogni-
tive abilities. The herein discussed process of learning a motorically-complex 
dance shows the manner in which such a cognitive acceleration is possible - 
and it appears that there is nothing magical about it, even though it is not 
without  certain  tricks,  such  as  marking.  Those  tricks  may  appear  obvious 
(which is likely why there is no space devoted to them in professional litera-
ture), however, they allow artists to exceed their own limitations and to liter-
ally go beyond themselves. 
Kirsh’s research exemplifies that it is worth utilising (seemingly) banal exam-
ples if we can treat them as models of more complex processes, in a manner 
similar to how marking and dancing distorted versions of phrases aids in mas-
tering them better and in “understanding” dance. Similarly, each of us can 
utilise their knowledge of mundane activities, games or puzzles in order to 
understand how to more efficiently learn from others, improve on our own, 
and pass knowledge to others. 
 